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INTRODUCTION
One man’s overcrowding is another man’s opportunity for
profit—at least that is how private corporations have approached in-
carceration in the United States. The United States’ prison population
exploded after 1971 when President Richard Nixon officially declared
a “War on Drugs.”1 The War on Drugs initially targeted the increased
abuse of controlled substances such as heroin, amphetamines, and
mixed barbiturates.2 However, the Reagan administration escalated
the War on Drugs and targeted the crack cocaine epidemic in urban
communities—a crisis that critics suggest was more likely a panic
induced by sensational news media.3 As a result, municipalities
* JD/PhD in Sociology, University of Arizona. The author would like to thank Toni
Massaro and John Dacey for their unrelenting support of this research. Any errors are
the author’s own.
1. See President Richard Nixon, Remarks to the American People About an Intensi-
fied Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971), in AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3047 [https://perma.cc/4E
5C-4ENZ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (stating “America’s public enemy number one in the
United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to
wage a new, all-out offensive.”).
2. See Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, FRONTLINE, https://www
.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron [https://perma.cc/PA6E-2U4G] (last visited
Apr. 5, 2019).
3. See President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against
Drug Abuse (Sept. 14, 1986), in RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://
527
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exponentially increased policing in urban areas, sparking what even-
tually became a systematic trend toward mass incarceration.4 The
War on Drugs—in combination with the introduction of mandatory
minimum sentencing and harsher penalties for repeat offenders—
led to drastic conditions of overcrowding in prisons.5 In response,
private corporations seized the opportunity to alleviate overcrowded
conditions by bidding for government contracts to construct and
manage correctional facilities across the nation.6
Just as the private prison industry witnessed broad expansion
in the United States, it was coming to a startling halt in Israel.7 In
2009, the Supreme Court of Israel deemed private prisons constitu-
tionally invalid after the proposal of a single facility.8 Though the
United States and Israel share democratic and constitutional princi-
ples, the legal treatment of prison privatization widely diverges. To
explain this paradox, this Article begins with a description of the
private prison industry in the United States (Part I), followed by
pertinent economic and political conflicts of interest (Part II). Part
III examines the foundational constitutional principles of the non-
delegation doctrine and the social contract in the United States, and
Part IV presents a comparative analysis of those principles in the
Israeli Supreme Court decision Academic Center of Law and Business
v. Minister of Finance.9 The Conclusion provides recommendations
for constitutional treatment of liberty interests, particularly as they
pertain to social service provision in the private sector.
I. THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY
Today, the United States boasts the world’s highest incarcera-
tion rate.10 The United States contains less than 5% of the world’s
www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/091486a [https://perma.cc/KTD6-GT8G] (last
visited Apr. 5, 2019) (“Today there’s a new epidemic: smokable cocaine, otherwise known
as crack. It is an explosively destructive and often lethal substance which is crushing its
users. It is an uncontrolled fire.”). For an extensive critique of the War on Drugs, see gen-
erally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (The New Press 2010).
4. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 54–56.
5. Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Nondelegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization,
35 UCLA L. REV. 911, 911 (1988).
6. See id. at 912.
7. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
27, 34 (2009) (Isr.). The case is also available online as part of the Private Corrections
Working Group website: http://www.privateci.org/private_pics/Israel_Ruling.pdf.
8. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
27, 34 (2009) (Isr.).
9. See id.
10. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 3 (International Centre for
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population, but it hosts approximately a quarter of the world’s prison
population.11 Federal and state governments have been overwhelmed
with hazardous conditions of overcrowding while facing a steady in-
flux of offenders. For example, in Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court
held that the operation of California state prisons at 200% capacity
for over a decade violated the inmates’ constitutional rights.12 Gov-
ernments responded to the shortage by delegating prison construc-
tion and management to for-profit corporations.13 The privatization
of prisons further escalated in 1992, when President George H. W.
Bush issued an executive order to promote the privatization of gov-
ernment functions.14 Executive Order No. 12803 urged agency officials
to “[r]eview those procedures affecting the management and disposi-
tion of federally financed infrastructure assets owned by State and
local governments and modify those procedures to encourage appro-
priate privatization of such assets.”15 Since 1999, the number of in-
mates housed in private prisons has grown by 90%,16 and by 2014,
private prisons housed 19% of federal prisoners and about 7% of state
inmates.17 Though the adoption of privately run correctional facilities
varies by state, the highest usage is in New Mexico—where approxi-
mately two out of five prisoners are housed in private facilities.18
According to the Justice Policy Institute, a private prison is
defined as “a facility managed by a for-profit organization through
a public-private partnership with a government contract.”19 Private
corporations either construct new facilities or assume management
of existing facilities. In order to profit from prison management,
corporations contract with the government and establish a daily fee
Prison Studies 12th ed.), http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/down
loads/wppl_12.pdf.
11. Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 23, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht-23prison.1225
3738.html [https://perma.cc/SD2Y-LLL2].
12. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011).
13. Lauren Salins & Shepard Simpson, Note, Efforts to Fix a Broken System: Brown v.
Plata and the Prison Overcrowding Epidemic, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1153, 1193–94 (2013).
14. Exec. Order No. 12803, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,063 (Apr. 30, 1992).
15. Id. at 12803(3)(a). “Infrastructure asset” is defined as “any asset financed in whole
or in part by the Federal Government and needed for the functioning of the economy” such
as “roads, tunnels, . . . schools, prisons, and hospitals.” Id. at 12803(1)(b) (emphasis added).
16. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014 13 (Sept.
2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf (showing an increase from 69,000
prisoners in 1999 to 131,300 prisoners in 2014).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES
OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES 4 (June
2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system
.pdf.
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per inmate based on actual or minimum guaranteed occupancy.20
States have incentive to delegate corrections because the corpora-
tions market the privately run facilities as less expensive, more
efficient alternatives to state-run facilities.21 Private prisons have
the ability to construct facilities faster and institute innovative in-
carceration approaches—all while bypassing burdensome govern-
mental bureaucracy.22
Two corporations dominate the United States’ private prison
industry: CoreCivic (formerly the Corrections Corporation of America)
and the GEO Group (formerly Wackenhut Corrections Corporations).23
Together, these publicly traded entities control 75% of the nation’s
private prisons.24 In 2017, CoreCivic owned or managed “70 correc-
tional . . . facilities, . . . approximately 78,000 beds in 19 states.”25
CoreCivic generated over a million dollars in revenue and a net in-
come of $178,040 in 2017.26 While participation in a billion-dollar
industry is attractive to savvy investors and businessmen alike, one
may be surprised to discover that Thurgood Marshall, Jr.—son of the
late Supreme Court Justice and Brown v. Board of Education plain-
tiffs’ attorney—has been a member of the CoreCivic Board of Directors
since December 2002.27
The GEO Group is a transnational corporation that specializes
in the “ownership, leasing and management of correctional, detention
and reentry facilities,” with operations in the United States, Australia,
South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Canada.28 To date, the GEO
Group operates or manages 141 facilities (96,000 beds) across the
United States.29 In 2017, the GEO Group generated $2.2 million in
revenue and $146,000 in net income.30 Over 40% of the GEO Group’s
revenue currently stems from relationships with the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, the U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
and the U.S. Marshals Service.31
20. See id.
21. See Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L.
REV. 531, 541 (1989).
22. See id.
23. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437,
459 (2005).
24. Id.
25. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Feb. 22, 2018) [hereinafter
CoreCivic 2017 Annual Report] (available at http://ir.corecivic.com/node/19866/html).
26. Id. at 50.
27. Board of Directors, CORRECTIONS CORP. AM., http://www.corecivic.com/investors
/board-of-directors [https://perma.cc/4Q5X-RC64] (last visited Apr. 5, 2019).
28. The GEO Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Feb. 26, 2018) [hereinafter GEO
Group 2017 Annual Report] (available at https://last10k.com/sec-filings/geo).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 54, 84.
31. Id. at 12–19.
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The size and expansion of the private prison industry reflects the
growing demand for privatized corrections in the United States. In
hopes of preserving government resources, many state governments
have legitimized prison privatization by enacting statutory provi-
sions that authorize private prison contracts.32 Despite important
governmental interests in administrative and economic efficiency,
prison privatization presents conflicting outcomes between economic
interests and the pursuit of democracy and justice.
II. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Private prison corporations’ economic motives clash with social
and political goals of inmate rehabilitation, crime reduction, and de-
creased recidivism.33 Because prison corporations have economic
incentives to maintain high incarceration rates (essentially to ‘fill
beds’), companies expend substantial resources to encourage favorable
political influence. For example, each year, both CoreCivic and the
GEO Group report millions of dollars in lobbying expenditures and
political contributions.34 The companies exert pressure on government
actors—many at the state and local level—to discourage leniency on
crime and dissuade alternatives to incarceration.35 Furthermore,
prison corporations regularly circumvent the political process when
acquiring contracts for prison construction. Traditionally, construction
plans for correctional facilities are subject to voter approval of a bond
32. See, e.g., Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-101
(1986); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 47-802 (2001).
33. Karl Marx discussed the nature of private interests as inherently negative and
contradictory to societal interests, stating:
[p]rivate interest, however, is always cowardly, for its heart, its soul, is an ex-
ternal object which can always be wrenched away and injured, and who has
not trembled at the danger of losing heart and soul? How could the selfish leg-
islator be human when something inhuman, an alien material essence, is his
supreme essence? ‘Quand il a peur, il est terrible [When he is afraid, he is ter-
rible],’ says the National about Guizot. These words could be inscribed as a
motto over all legislation inspired by self-interest, and therefore by cowardice.
Marx, infra note 35, at 236.
34. Suevon Lee, By the Numbers: The U.S.’s Growing For-Profit Detention Industry,
PROPUBLICA (June 20, 2012, 2:41 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/by-the-num
bers-the-u.s.s-growing-for-profit-detention-industry [https://perma.cc/D2V4-CUHG]. For
example, in 2014, the GEO Group reported $2.5 million in direct lobbying expenditures,
$2.2 million of which was spent at the state and local levels. THE GEO GROUP, POLITICAL
ACTIVITY AND LOBBYING REPORT 4 (2014), http://www.geogroup.com/Portals/0/PREA_Cer
tifications/Political_Activity_Re port_2014.pdf.
35. See POLITICAL ACTIVITY & LOBBYING REPORT, supra note 34. Marx was especially
critical of the relationship between government actors and private actors: “Private interest
is no more made capable of legislating by being installed on the throne of the legislator than
a mute is made capable of speech by being given an enormously long speaking-trumpet.”
Karl Marx, Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood, in 1 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS,
COLLECTED WORKS 261 (1975).
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in a referendum.36 However, the construction of facilities with private
financing does not require voter approval, therefore, “a government
entity can contract with a private prison company and force its citizens
to pay for the prison through their tax share even if the voters op-
pose such a move.”37 The unchecked construction of private prison
facilities ignores voters’ concerns and removes the voters’ voices from
correctional policies.38
Ultimately, prison corporations have transformed into vehicles
that perpetuate a regime of mass incarceration while also realizing
financial benefits. The longstanding conflict between societal progres-
sion and prison privatization is further demonstrated in an annual
report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, where
CoreCivic identifies the company’s risk factors:
The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely af-
fected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts . . . leniency in
conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or through
the decriminalization of certain activities that are currently pro-
scribed by criminal laws. For instance, any changes with respect
to drugs and controlled substances or illegal immigration could
affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced,
thereby potentially reducing demand for correctional . . . facilities
to house them. Immigration reform laws are currently a focus for
legislators and politicians at the federal, state, and local level.
Legislation has also been proposed in numerous jurisdictions
that could lower minimum sentences for some non-violent crimes
and make more inmates eligible for early release based on good
behavior. . . . [Also, sentencing alternatives under consideration
could put some offenders on probation with electronic monitor-
ing who would otherwise be incarcerated.] Similarly, reductions
in crime rates or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce crime
could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences re-
quiring incarceration at correctional facilities.39
The company’s statement highlights its concern that reductions in
crime or changes in criminal sentencing may result in empty prison
beds. To mitigate the risks of uncertainty and ensure a return on
investment, private prison contracts require governments to maintain
a minimum occupancy rate.40 One critic notes that “[n]early two-thirds
36. Rachel Christine Bailie Antonuccio, Prisons for Profit: Do the Social and Political
Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 577, 591 (2008).
37. Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of Governmental
Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 670 (1987).
38. See id.
39. CoreCivic 2017 Annual Report, supra note 25, at 30 (emphasis added).
40. Michael Cohen, How for-Profit Prisons Have Become the Biggest Lobby No One
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of private prison contracts mandate that state and local govern-
ments maintain a certain occupancy rate—usually 90 percent—or
require taxpayers to pay for empty beds.”41 Although these manda-
tory minimums are already exceptional, the states of Arizona and
Oklahoma represent the most extreme cases. These states entered
into three contracts that guaranteed minimum occupancies of 100%
and 98%, respectively.42
In addition to minimum occupancy clauses, scholars suggest that
prison corporations protect their financial interests by reducing op-
erating costs in staffing and training programs.43 Such concerns may
not be frivolous, as parties need not specify a staff-inmate ratio in the
contractual agreements.44 In one instance, North Carolina legislators
and residents discovered that the private corporation would have 68
correctional officers supervising 528 inmates, whereas the state would
employ 141 correctional officers under similar circumstances.45 Be-
cause an adequate and well-trained staff is fundamental to ensure
order in the prison environment, cost-cutting measures in staff em-
ployment and training may jeopardize the safety of inmates, employ-
ees, and the surrounding community. Indeed, inadequate security
mechanisms such as a faulty alarm system and insufficient security
personnel were blamed for the escape of three inmates from an
Arizona private prison.46 That escape resulted in the murder of two
community residents.47
The harms of financial and socio-political conflicts have mani-
fested in reproachful ways. For example, Pennsylvania magistrates
Judge Mark Ciavarella, Jr. and Judge Michael Conahan were
convicted of engaging in a kickback scheme referred to as “kids-for-
cash.”48 Judges Ciavarella and Conahan were sentenced to twenty-
eight years and seventeen years in prison, respectively, after they
Is Talking About, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/post
everything/wp/2015/04/28/how-for-profit-prisons-have-become-the-biggest-lobby-no-one
-is-talking-about [https://perma.cc/Z9DT-53G6].
41. Id.
42. Alex Friedmann, Apples-to-Fish: Public and Private Prison Cost Comparisons, 42
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503, 540 (2014).
43. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 21, at 718; see also Dolovich, supra note 23, at 475.
44. Robbins, supra note 21, at 695.
45. Antonuccio, supra note 36, at 591.
46. Michael Brickner & Shakyra Diaz, Prisons for Profit: Incarceration for Sale, 38
HUMAN RTS. 13 (2011).
47. Id.
48. Reagan Ali, Judge Sentenced to 28 Years for Selling ‘Kids For Cash’ to Prisons,
MINT PRESS NEWS (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.mintpressnews.com/judge-sentenced-to
-28-years-for-selling-kids-for-cash-to-prisons/209013 [https://perma.cc/PQ8H-JE3B]; Jon
Schuppe, Pennsylvania Seeks to Close Books on “Kids for Cash” Scandal, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 12, 2015, 5:42 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pennsylvania-seeks
-close-books-kids-cash-scandal-n408666 [https://perma.cc/WQT7-TCVU].
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were found guilty of accepting $1 million in bribes from the co-owner
of two private juvenile facilities.49 In exchange for kickbacks, the
judges granted guilty convictions and imposed harsh sentences to over
2,500 juveniles and assigned them to the private juvenile facility.50
Ciavarella and Conahan’s actions expose the disastrous potential of
significant private influence in the criminal justice system.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND PRISON PRIVATIZATION
While the emergence of prison privatization presents unsettling
consequences for political and societal interests, it also lends itself
to legal questions regarding the constitutionality of such delegations.
However, the legality of for-profit prisons is nested in a larger, in-
tricate metanarrative about the relationship between private actors
and the state. With the introduction of corporate lobbying, disappear-
ing limits on corporate campaign expenditures, and the growing usage
of government contractors, the line between the public and private
sectors has been increasingly blurred.51 The massive regime of con-
tracting and delegation of public services to private actors creates
unprecedented complexities for governance and unexpected outcomes.
Because the delegation of public services both alters our understand-
ing of roles and duties, and affects organizational behaviors, it has
significant implications for accountability, liability, and constitution-
ality. The emergence of private prisons serves as the quintessential
example of this constitutional paradox as the private sector expands
into the public realm.
A. The State Action Doctrine
According to the Fourteenth Amendment, “No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”52 The
Court has emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment only guards
against the infringement of constitutional rights by state actors.53
The Court proclaimed that “the essential dichotomy set forth in [the
Fourteenth] Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject
49. Schuppe, supra note 48.
50. Id.
51. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (hold-
ing that corporations’ political speech is protected); H. Brinton Milward & Keith G. Provan,
Governing the Hollow State, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 359 (2000).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
53. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
2019] THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVATE PRISONS 535
to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, ‘however dis-
criminatory or wrongful,’ against which the Fourteenth Amendment
offers no shield.”54
Despite the phrasing of the Fourteenth Amendment, subsequent
jurisprudence has acknowledged that conduct by private actors may
be considered state action in limited circumstances.55 For example,
private action may become government action if the task is one that
has been traditionally and exclusively conducted by the government.56
Though the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted this public
function requirement,57 the Court has recognized the importance of
government accountability by suggesting that the government cannot
avoid accountability by delegating its tasks to private entities.58 Also,
private action may be considered state action if the actions are suf-
ficiently entangled—meaning the government “affirmatively autho-
rizes, encourages, or facilitates private conduct” in such a way that
the private conduct could not have occurred without the government.59
The Court has found sufficient entanglement in judicial enforcement
of private action,60 extensive government regulation,61 and govern-
ment provision of subsidies.62 For example, in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, the Court reviewed a Fourteenth Amendment chal-
lenge against the owner of a restaurant located in a public parking
garage.63 The Court held that the owner’s refusal to serve a cus-
tomer based on race violated the Equal Protection Clause.64 The
Court pointed out that the significant use of public funds to construct,
operate, and maintain the building constituted joint participation
54. Id.
55. See cases cited infra note 57.
56. See id. at 349–50.
57. See generally Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (applying public function ex-
ception to parks); Terry v. Adams, 354 U.S. 461 (1953) (applying public function exception
to voting); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (applying public function exception to
company towns).
58. See West v. Akins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988).
59. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 539 (4th
ed. 2011).
60. See generally Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding that mere
state aid to a private actor can be entanglement); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(holding that a state enforcing a contract is state action); cf. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978) (ruling that a private entity’s actions can be considered state action if the
entity is conducting activities similar to those of a state actor).
61. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723–24 (1961). But see
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (holding that government regulation
of liquor licenses was not enough to constitute a private club’s conduct as state action).
62. See Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 578 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 464–65 (1973).
63. Burton, 365 U.S. 715 at 716.
64. Id. at 717–18; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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by the state such that the restaurant owner’s conduct cannot be
“purely private.”65
If “prisoner[s] [do] not shed . . . basic constitutional rights at the
prison gate[s],”66 then constitutional protections should not hinge on
whether those gates are publicly or privately owned. Based on the
Court’s analysis in Wilmington Parking Authority, little doubt exists
that the state’s extensive interaction with prison corporations is
sufficiently deemed state action. Though it is arguable whether cor-
rections is a public function traditionally and exclusively reserved
to the government;67 the services provided by the private prisons are
otherwise indistinguishable from those performed by the state.68 In
fact, inmates have no choice in whether they will be assigned to a
public or private facility. Furthermore, the economic interdependence
that characterized the state’s relationship with the restaurant in
Wilmington Parking Authority is exacerbated in the case of private
prisons. Prison corporations would be nonexistent without state actors,
for all prison contracts are established with government agencies.69
For example, in 2017, CoreCivic reported that approximately 52%
of its revenue was derived from federal correctional and detention
authorities, and management contracts with state correctional
authorities represented approximately 38% of total revenue.70 The
significant state funding, in combination with the immense govern-
ment regulation and substantial judicial involvement, undoubtedly
constitutes state action and subjects prison corporations to scrutiny
under the United States Constitution.
B. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The Supreme Court of the United States has also acknowledged
that there are certain governmental functions that cannot be dele-
gated to private parties,71 a concept known as the nondelegation
doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine is based on the constitutional
provision that “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
65. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
66. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 581 (1974).
67. Cf. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (describing a private
entity as exercising a public function because it performed a duty normally reserved to
the state).
68. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503 (1946) (finding constitutional deprivation
in a company town and its shopping district, where “there is nothing to distinguish them
from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property
belongs to a private corporation.”).
69. See, e.g., CoreCivic 2017 Annual Report, supra note 25.
70. CoreCivic 2017 Annual Report, supra note 25, at 68.
71. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936).
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in a Congress of the United States.”72 However, the Necessary and
Proper Clause of the Constitution permits Congress to “delegat[e] . . .
authority . . . sufficient to effect its purposes.”73 The nondelegation
doctrine represents the notion that certain duties are so closely
aligned with sovereignty that they are inherently governmental—
responsibilities such as war-making, lawmaking, and imposing
taxes.74 The question then lies as to which other governmental pur-
poses can be properly delegated and which are traditional government
functions. Despite the fundamental nature of these tasks, courts in
constitutional democratic nations have been eerily silent on issues
of privatization and have evaded quests to identify these core gov-
ernmental functions.75
One scholar suggests that the process of identifying core govern-
mental functions is elusive because such functions are fluid; thus,
“essential components of governance [are] matters of political, eco-
nomic and social preference . . . properly, in a democracy, left to the
choice of the electorate.”76 Legal scholar Judith Resnik seems to
agree, and she proposes that the time is now to address “what it is
that we—in democratic constitutional polities—want . . . to be a func-
tion of the state, both transnationally and within a particular govern-
ment.”77 At its core, the nondelegation doctrine represents the early
ideas that the identification of core governmental functions is neces-
sary and should extend beyond a mere political exercise to serve as
a framework for private-public partnerships.78
Deprivation of liberty may be one function that is inherently
governmental and should not be delegated to private parties. Though
the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated this particular issue,
strong arguments exist that 1) liberty deprivation should be classi-
fied as a solely state function, and 2) the delegation of incarceration
to private corporations violates the nondelegation doctrine.79 The
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
73. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
74. See Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), Constitutionalization, and
Statization: Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 162, 168 (2013).
75. Id. at 165–67. The “[Israeli] court styled its ruling as predicated on inmates’
personal rights rather than on a structural analysis of what constituted the “hard core”
of sovereign powers’ that could not be delegated ‘to private enterprises.’ ” Id. at 166–67.
76. Id. at 165 (quoting Opinion, Jeffery Jowell, HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law
and Business v. Minister of Finance (Isr. Aug. 20, 2006) ¶ 30).
77. Id. at 170. The Supreme Court of India has embarked on this quest, declaring that
policing and law and order are state subjects. See Sundar v. Chattisgarh, (2011) 7 SCC
547 ¶ 41 (India) (available at http://pudr.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/nandini%20suna
dar%20vs%20chattisgarh_0.pdf).
78. See Resnik, supra note 74, at 170–71.
79. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
27 (2009) (Isr.); see generally Sundar v. Chattisgarh, (2011) 7 SCC 547 ¶ 41 (India).
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primary challenge to a nondelegation argument is that the U.S.
Supreme Court considers the doctrine moribund.80 The use of the
doctrine has dissipated over time, among the likes of substantive
due process and the restrictive commerce clause doctrines of the
New Deal Era.81 The cases that presented successful claims against
delegations to private parties under the nondelegation doctrine all
occurred during this period.82 Still, the New Deal era cases primar-
ily dealt with property interests, not liberty interests.83 Since then,
the Court has hinted at the revival of the nondelegation doctrine
and has insinuated that delegations interfering with liberty inter-
ests may warrant a higher standard.84 In a concurring opinion in
Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum,85 Justice Rehnquist
wrote separately on delegation grounds:
We ought not to shy away from our judicial duty to invalidate
unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority solely out of
concern that we should thereby reinvigorate discredited consti-
tutional doctrines of the pre–New Deal era. If the nondelegation
doctrine has fallen into the same desuetude as have substantive
due process and restrictive interpretations of the Commerce
Clause, it is, as one writer has phrased it, ‘a case of death by
association.’86
In spite of these subtle hints of the nondelegation doctrine’s continued
relevance, the Supreme Court has blatantly skirted the delegation
issue in recent attempts to review the nondelegation doctrine.87 For
example, in Department of Transportation v. Association of American
80. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring). The Court has not upheld a nondelegation challenge since
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
81. See Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 311.
82. See id.; see generally Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S.
116 (1928); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
83. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543 (1935).
84. See id. at 352–53 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating the delegation doctrine “has
been virtually abandoned by the Court for all practical purposes,” except where personal
liberties are involved); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (stating if a citizen’s liberty
to travel is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of Congress,
and any delegation of the power must be subject to adequate standards and delegated
authority will be narrowly construed).
85. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum, 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
86. Id. at 686 (emphasis in original) (citing J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 133 (1980)).
87. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (“The excellent briefs filed
by the parties and their amici curiae have provided us with valuable historical information
that illuminates the delegation issue but does not really bear on the narrow issue that
is dispositive of these cases.”).
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Railroads, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision that
Amtrak is a private entity and Congress’s grant of joint authority to
issue metrics and standards that address the performance and sched-
uling of passenger railroad services violates nondelegation principles.88
Instead, the Court held that Amtrak is “not an autonomous private en-
terprise” and acts as “a governmental entity for purposes of the Consti-
tution’s separation of powers provisions,” so there are no delegation
issues at stake.89 The Court hesitates to reinvigorate the nondele-
gation doctrine, but exhibits willingness to adopt other rationales for
the same result.90 Perhaps the Court’s reluctance stems from the
notion that the revival of the nondelegation doctrine may challenge
substantial portions of the current administrative state.91
If the U.S. Supreme Court were to grant certiorari on a non-
delegation issue, three arguments favor a constitutional challenge
to prison delegation. First, the Court has deemed delegations uncon-
stitutional when the delegation is in a core legislative field.92 In
Whalen v. United States, the Court determined that the power to
define criminal offenses and to prescribe punishment resides wholly
within Congress.93 Extending this logic, the power to define criminal
offenses and to prescribe punishment may be classified into a broader
category of liberty deprivation. These legislative functions act to
limit the actions of individual citizens, establishing what one can and
cannot do under eyes of the law. Secondly, the Court held that delega-
tions affecting fundamental rights—such as liberty interests—are
more likely to be found unconstitutional.94 In his concurring opinion
in United States v. Robel, Justice Brennan noted that when funda-
mental rights are at stake, broad statutory delegations are viewed
with heightened scrutiny.95 Additionally, scholars and state court
judges have proposed special conditions for delegations to private
entities.96 For example, the Texas court judge in Texas Boll Weevil
88. Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. Dep’t of Transp., 865 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C 2012), rev’d,
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1228 (2015).
89. Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1232–33.
90. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448–49.
91. Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court’s Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine
in Clinton v. City of New York: More Than ‘A Dime’s Worth of Difference,’ 49 CATH. U.
L. REV. 337, 340 (2000).
92. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980).
93. Id.
94. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 275 (“This is because the numerous deficiencies connected with vague leg-
islative directives . . . are far more serious when liberty and the exercise of fundamental
rights are at stake.”) (Brennan, J., concurring).
96. See George W. Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitu-
tional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 659 (1975) (stating “[w]here a delegation by virtue of its
content or breadth calls into question the future operation of the political process, judi-
cial scrutiny seems warranted”).
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Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen was particularly concerned with
the private status of the delegate and suggested that private dele-
gates be held to a higher scrutiny.97
On the other hand, when examining statutory delegations, courts
review the governing standards of the delegation to determine if the
statute has sufficient standards and limitations, and it reserves some
decision-making power for the government.98 A successful claim
under the nondelegation doctrine would need to refute the adequacy
of governing standards and challenge the effectiveness of government
supervision.99 Though governments have provided clear, explicit stan-
dards and regulations for private prisons, recent jurisprudence im-
plies that states may be yielding decision-making power.100 For
example, following the general principles of agency law, authority and
control correspond with liability.101 However, in Minneci v. Pollard,
the Court shifts liability to private corporations—holding that federal
inmates in private prisons cannot bring a Bivens action against the
government, as the prisons are considered contractors.102 Thus, in-
mates’ remedies lie solely within civil actions against the corpora-
tion, inferring that the government has a limited amount of control
in the operations of private prisons.
C. Classical Constitutional Principles
Among other classical thinkers, the ideologies of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and John Locke heavily influenced the moral doctrines of
liberal democracy.103 The Framers of the U.S. Constitution relied on
political and philosophical understandings to create strong founda-
tions for self-governance.104 Core to these understandings is the social
contract doctrine, which describes the notion of an implicit agreement
between a state and its citizens:
97. See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 469–70
(Tex. 1997).
98. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
99. See McGautha v. Cal., 402 U.S. 183, 277–78 (1971).
100. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012).
101. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1957).
102. See Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 620; see also Sasha Volokh, The Surprising Truth
About Suing Private Prisons, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/19/the-surprising-truth-about-suing-private
-prisons [https://perma.cc/T9V7-4SXF].
103. Nelson Lund, Rousseau: Radical Philosopher, Political Conservative, WASH. POST
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/06
/rousseau-radical-philosopher-political-conservative/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.207c0e8
a2f1c [https://perma.cc/5W9B-R72H].
104. See Jed Rubenfeld, Of Constitutional Self-Government, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749,
1761 (2003).
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[that] each one of us puts into the community his [or her] person
and all his [or her] powers under the supreme direction of the
general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an
indivisible part of the whole . . . this act of association creates an
artificial and corporate body composed of as many members as
there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that body
acquires its unity, its common ego, its life and its will.105
In the metaphorical social contract, citizens agree to abide by laws and
sacrifice certain freedoms in exchange for protection from the gov-
ernment.106 In return, the government is subject to particular re-
straints and boundaries that it must observe to ensure the cooperation
of its constituency.107 The most rudimentary of these obligations is
the government’s duty to preserve the natural rights of its citi-
zenry.108 The rights to life, liberty, and property are inalienable—they
cannot be delegated, given or taken away.109 The enumeration of
these rights in the Constitution does not indicate that the govern-
ment grants these rights; rather, enumeration is merely an acknowl-
edgement of an individual’s natural rights.110 Though the state does
not grant natural rights and the state cannot revoke natural rights,
a government can deprive an individual of his or her natural rights
by disabling the exercise of these rights.111 For example, incarcera-
tion is the deprivation of individual liberty as a form of punishment.
Even so, governmental deprivation can only occur strictly under the
due process of law.112
Still, the social contract represents the notion that certain govern-
mental functions cannot be delegated—invoking the aforementioned
dilemma113 of identifying those core governmental functions.114 Indeed,
105. Paul Moyle, Separating the Allocation of Punishment from Its Administration:
Theoretical and Empirical Observations, 41 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 77, 78 (2001) (quoting
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 61 (1968)) (emphasis in original).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 79.
108. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 105 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 105 (“[The Fourteenth] amendment was intended to give practical effect
to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator,
which the law does not confer, but only recognizes.”).
111. Id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. This concern is critical to understandings of sovereignty, authority, and legitimacy.
Resnik, supra note 74, at 168 (“When god and monarchy no longer sufficed, the provision
of ‘peace and security’ became a pillar of sovereignty, manifested through the devel-
opment of administrative capacities to police, adjudicate, and punish. Democratic regimes
offered another basis, popular sovereignty, in which the relationship between citizen and
state licensed governments to impose violence on their own populations. Constitutions—
democratic and not—codified both that authority and its limits.”).
114. Moyle, supra note 105, at 79 (“A social contract compels a compact between the
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one critic identifies this weakness as evidence that privately con-
tracting the management of corrections does not breach the social
contract: “[w]hen criminal justice is broken down into specific activi-
ties or into functions and subfunctions, it is no longer clear that any
of these tasks must be the exclusive province of the state.”115 However,
Resnik argues that this approach may be reversed, and instead, these
roles become governmental functions “by placing them outside the
purview of total third-party provisioning.”116
Nonetheless, certain rights are embedded in the social contract,
such as the right to punish individuals who violate societal rules.117
While citizens may subject themselves to the deprivation of natural
rights by the government, they do not yield this same power to pri-
vate entities:
When we agree to the laws . . . we accept the proposition that if
we ever break the law we ought to be punished. Criminals are
punished, then, with their own consent. And if this isn’t active
and explicit consent, then it is constructive and tacit: for the
criminal has lived under and enjoyed the benefits of the laws,
and could have participated in the making of these laws. . . . But
if this is right, then it is crucial that the agents of punishment be
agents of the laws and of the people who make them. Though it may
sound paradoxical, the criminal is punished by his own agents—
who are ours too. That’s why private punishment is ruled out.
We can’t be judges or police or jailers in our own name or for our
own purposes. It is only some public purpose, which the criminal
could share—which, as a fellow citizen, he does share—that jus-
tifies punishment.118
Under this interpretation, it is a violation of the social contract for
the government to delegate the power to deprive liberty to private
corporations—“just as citizens must obey sovereign law, so too must
the law be sovereign.”119 Legal scholar Barak Medina aptly summa-
rizes how the delegation of this power is ultimately problematic:
state and its citizens, and government’s authority to divest its powers to private non-gov-
ernment entities therefore is inextricably linked to its reciprocal obligation to maintain
these core powers. Core powers are notoriously difficult to identify.”) (emphasis omitted).
115. Id. at 80 (quoting C. H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 58–59 (1990))
(emphasis in original).
116. Resnik, supra note 74, at 170.
117. See Joycelyn M. Pollock, The Rationale for Imprisonment, in PRISONS TODAY AND
TOMORROW 4 (3d ed. 2014).
118. Yoav Peled & Doron Navot, Private Incarceration—Towards a Philosophical
Critique, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 216, 225 (2012) (quoting Brief for Michael Walzer as Sup-
porting Plaintiffs, HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of
Finance PD, 27, (2009) (Isr.) (emphasis in original)).
119. Moyle, supra note 105, at 79.
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“The principle that the state should decide not only on the sanction
but also execute it, to ensure that it ‘discharges its basic responsibility
as sovereign for enforcing the criminal law and furthering the general
public interest,’ is a principle that deals with the public interest in
general.”120 The notion that delegation of corrections is fundamen-
tally contradictory to public interests, without needing to show actual
harm, is further exemplified in the Israel Supreme Court’s decision
banning private prisons.
IV. INSIGHTS FROM ISRAEL’S ACADEMIC CENTER DECISION
In 2009, Israel’s highest court recognized the discrepancy be-
tween public and private interests.121 The Supreme Court of Israel
declared private prisons unconstitutional and held that the delegation
of prisons to private parties is a violation of basic human rights.122
Through a critical review of Academic Center of Law and Business v.
Minister of Finance,123 the landmark decision that created an inter-
national precedent, this Article examines how the reasoning behind
the Israeli decision reflects American democratic values and proposes
potential arguments for stronger protections of liberty interests. Aca-
demic Center suggests that the delegation of prisons to private corpo-
rations morally and legally infringes on dogmas that are central to
the core foundations of American democracy.124
In 2004, the enactment of the Prisons Ordinance Amendment
Law (Amendment 28) authorized the establishment of private prisons
in Israel.125 By contracting corrections to private companies, the state
agreed to pay a fixed cost per inmate to avoid the costs of construct-
ing additional facilities.126 The petition, filed by the Academic Col-
lege of Law in Ramat Gan, presented a two-pronged challenge to the
law.127 First, they argued that the transfer of prison powers to pri-
vate parties is fundamentally a violation of the rights to liberty and
dignity.128 Secondly, the motivations to maximize shareholder wealth
120. Barak Medina, Constitutional Limits to Privatization: The Israeli Supreme Court
Decision to Invalidate Prison Privatization, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 690, 709 (2010) (footnote
omitted).
121. See HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance
PD, 27, 27 (2009) (Isr.).
122. Id. at 27–28.
123. Id. at 27.
124. Id. at 126–27.
125. Prison Ordinance (Amendment No. 28), SEFER HA-HUKIM [official gazette], No.
1935, at 348 (5764-2004) [hereinafter Amendment 28].
126. See HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance
PD, 27, 128–29, 163 (2009) (Isr.).
127. Id. at 34–37.
128. Id. at 28.
544 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 25:527
provide strong incentives for private corporations to cut costs in
facility management and staff wages, thereby violating prisoners’
rights.129 The Court found private prisons unconstitutional based on
the transfer of powers alone, and therefore, did not address the
second argument.130
Israeli law states that while imprisonment is inherently a loss
of liberty, one’s incarceration does not justify additional violations
of human rights.131 In Academic Center, one issue was whether the
transfer of power to a private corporation alone violated inmates’
constitutional rights to personal liberty and dignity.132 Secondly,
could the state give the authority to deny liberty to a party that
operated to advance private interests?133 Ultimately, the Court con-
cluded that to transfer authority for managing the prison to a pri-
vate contractor whose aim is monetary profit would severely violate
the prisoners’ basic human rights to dignity and freedom.134
Though the ruling appears to be solely based on principles of
human rights, heightened protections for liberty interests in the social
contract theory and the nondelegation doctrine consistently re-emerge
throughout the Court’s reasoning. Writing for the majority, Presi-
dent Dorit Beinisch135 determined that Amendment 28 grants inva-
sive powers to a private party.136 The Court opined, inter alia, that
the ability of private corporations to subject inmates to solitary con-
finement for up to forty-eight hours, to order invasive inspections of
naked bodies, and to use reasonable force constituted a “serious
violation of the rights to personal liberty and human dignity.”137
A. The State Action Doctrine
In many ways, the onslaught of privatization in Israel mirrors
that of the United States. The private sector finances and produces
goods and services formerly provided by the state, and the state
129. Id. at 27–28.
130. Id. at 27–28.
131. Id. at 56.
132. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
27, 56–57, 163 (2009) (Isr.).
133. Id. at 70.
134. Id. at 28.
135. For the Supreme Court of Israel, the President is the presiding judge, similar to
the role of the United States Chief Justice. The Supreme Court of Israel is composed of
the President, the Deputy President, and thirteen Justices. For more information on the
current organization of the court, see http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/judges/judges.html#12
[https://perma.cc/55LA-7FZN].
136. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
27, 48 (2009) (Isr.).
137. Id.
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increasingly delegates powers to the private sector.138 While Israeli
law mandates public funding in areas such as education, health
care, and services pertaining to “social” rights, no such restrictions
exist for corrections.139 Moreover, the United States’ public function
doctrine for state action parallels Israel’s “quasi-public” entities doc-
trine, which “subjects any body authorized to employ governmental
powers to the norms of public law, most importantly human rights
laws, as well as to the jurisdiction of the Israeli administrative courts,
including the High Court of Justice.”140 Whereas the protections of
the United States’ Constitution typically only extend to private actors
in specific circumstances, private contractors with delegated govern-
mental powers are subject to judicial enforcement of the Israeli Con-
stitution.141 The Israeli Supreme Court operated under the assumption
that prison privatization constitutes state action, and the Court did
not engage in a separate analysis.142
However, the discussion of the public-private distinction is much
more nuanced in the Israel Court’s decision.143 Despite the innate
complexities of the interactions between the sectors, the Court pro-
ceeded based on key assumptions about characteristics of the private
and public sectors, adopting a hard-line distinction and ignoring the
intricacies of the relationship:
[i]t assumed that the market has a single stable content: it oper-
ates only for-profit and is both uncontrollable and unsupervisable,
thus undermining attempts at effective regulation. It further
assumed that the state always operates to promote the public
interest and its actions are transparent to the public and effec-
tively controlled by courts, despite evidence to the contrary in
many areas, including the publicly run prisons in Israel.144
The Court emphasized the underlying motivations as the distinguish-
ing factor for public and private interests, as evidenced in claim that
“the inmate of a privately managed prison is exposed to a violation
of his rights by a body that is motivated by a set of considerations
138. Medina, supra note 120, at 691–92.
139. Id. at 692; see also HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Society
et al. v. Minister of Finance ¶ 15 (2005) (Isr.).
140. Medina, supra note 120, at 693 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. (“The private exercising of government power is subject not only to (the re-
quired) effective supervision by the Executive Branch, but also to the judicially enforced
duties set forth by public law norms. Under Israeli law, the delegation of governmental
powers to private persons hardly changes the formal norms to which the power holder
is subject.”).
142. Id.
143. See Hila Shamir, The Public/Private Distinction Now: The Challenges of Priva-
tization and of the Regulatory State, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 4 (2014).
144. Id. at 20–21 (footnote omitted).
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and interests that is different from the one that motivates the state
when it manages and operates the public prisons.”145 The motivations,
presumably the public sector’s alignment with societal interests and
the private sector’s alignment with shareholder interests, are dis-
tinct enough to merit acceptable behavior in one and constitutional
invalidity in the other. According to the Israeli Supreme Court,
the scope of the violation of a prison inmate’s constitutional right
to personal liberty, when the entity responsible for his imprison-
ment is a private corporation motivated by economic consider-
ations of profit and loss, is inherently greater than the violation
of the same right of an inmate when the entity responsible for
his imprisonment is a government authority that is not moti-
vated by those considerations.146
Thus, it is not necessarily the classification of public versus private
that results in determinative outcomes for privatization. Rather,
theoretical institutional allegiances dictate the moral placement of
service provision, regardless of where the actual organization falls
on the public-private continuum. This idea is particularly interest-
ing in Israel’s case, as the state prisons failed to meet the minimum
legal requirements “especially with regard to the problem of over-
crowding and overpopulation and the lack of sufficient living space
for each person, sleeping on the floor without a bed, the lack of clean-
liness and sanitary rules and the lack of sufficient ventilation.”147
The irony here is that the private prisons proposed to significantly
improve inmate conditions through
more formal education, an increase in the scope of the employ-
ment of inmates in various jobs, . . . an increase in the physical
living space far beyond the essential minimum, an improvement
in the food, an increase in the number of family visiting days, an
increase in the educational staff, [and] an improvement in medi-
cal treatment.148
So though the private concessionaire petitioned to provide prisons
that were better than the poorly managed state prisons, the actor’s
fiduciary obligations to shareholders alone result in automatic as-
sumptions about the immoral nature of delegating corrections to
private corporations.
145. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
27, 70 (2009) (Isr.) (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 176 (quoting Crim A 7053/01 A v. State of Israel [62] 511).
148. Id. at 135.
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B. Principles of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Academic Center
Prior to Academic Center, delegations to private entities in Israel
were only required to meet procedural safeguards such as “setting
sufficient guidelines by the relevant public entity, taking steps to
prevent potential conflicts of interests in the specific context, and
implementing supervisory powers.”149 However, in Academic Center,
the Court applied the nondelegation doctrine’s concept of core gov-
ernmental functions to review the constitutionality of prison privat-
ization. Writing for the majority, President Beinisch emphasized
that punishment and law enforcement is exclusively a state function:
[the power to punish], as well as the powers of the other security
services, is an expression of a broader principle of the system of
government in Israel, according to which the state . . . has exclu-
sive authority to resort to the use of organized force in general,
and to enforce the criminal law in particular.150
The Court then restated the principles of the nondelegation
doctrine, framing the issue to emphasize both the exclusivity of the
government power and the preservation of fundamental rights:
“[t]he constitutional issue . . . is whether and to what extent the
state . . . may transfer to private enterprises the responsibility for
carrying out certain tasks that for years have been its exclusive
concern, . . . when those tasks involve a significant and fundamental
violation of human rights.”151
On the other hand, the Court appeared fully aware of the com-
plexities involved in identifying core governmental functions.
Though the Court acknowledges that imprisonment and the use of
organized force are within a “hard core” of government functions,
the majority refuses to articulate a criteria for determining which
functions are inherently governmental152:
the Government in a manner that enshrines on a constitutional
level the existence of a ‘hard core’ of sovereign powers that the gov-
ernment as the executive branch is liable to exercise itself and
that it may not transfer or delegate to private enterprises. . . .
[T]he powers involved in the imprisonment of offenders and in the
use of organized force on behalf of the state are indeed included
within this ‘hard core.’ Naturally, adopting an interpretation of
149. Medina, supra note 120, at 692 (footnote omitted).
150. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
27, 65 (2009) (Isr.) (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
152. See Resnik, supra note 74, at 170.
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this kind will require us to define clearly the limits of that ‘hard
core,’ since it may be assumed that there is no constitutional im-
pediment to privatization of the vast majority of services pro-
vided by the state, and this matter lies mainly within the scope
of the discretion of the legislative and executive branches.153
Still, in a concurring opinion, Justice Arbel included the broader func-
tion of liberty deprivation in the scope of the state’s core governmen-
tal functions: the “power [to deny liberties and make use of coercive
force] that was entrusted to the state as the agent of the political
community lies at the very heart of the government’s sovereign
functions, alongside the power to maintain an army, a police force
and courts.”154 Justice Arbel supports this reasoning by pointing to
the complex nature of the right to liberty.155 Liberty is a natural right,
he explains, so it is fundamental in and of itself, but it is also tightly
coupled with the exercise of other fundamental rights:
The right to personal liberty is without doubt one of the most
central and important basic rights in any democracy, and it was
recognized in our legal system before it was enshrined in the
Basic Law. Denying this right is one of the most severe viola-
tions possible in a democratic state that upholds the rule of law
and protects human rights. A violation of the right to personal
liberty is especially serious because it inherently involves a vio-
lation of a series of other human rights, whose potential realiza-
tion is restricted physically, mentally and ethically.156
The government argued that it was only seeking the assistance
of the private sector, not delegating or transferring its power to de-
prive liberty and use force.157 The Court rejected this argument,
pointing to the fact that private prisons have broad discretion to
manage the daily lives of the inmates as indicative of a complete
transfer of power.158 The government also argued that the Court
should defer to the government’s purposes unless the delegation was
such an egregious violation that it “shakes the foundations of de-
mocracy and the fundamental principles of the system of govern-
ment.”159 However, because of the delicate nature of the right to
153. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD
27, 100 (2009) (Isr.).
154. Id. at 106.
155. See id. at 106–07.
156. Id. at 58–59.
157. See id. at 71.
158. Id.
159. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD
27, 41 (2009) (Isr.).
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liberty, the Court articulated a heightened standard for liberty depri-
vation by a private entity:
The denial of personal liberty is justified only if it is done in order
to further or protect an essential public interest, and therefore
the question whether the party denying the liberty is acting in
order to further the public interest (whatever it may be) or is
mainly motivated by a private interest is a critical question that
lies at the very heart of the right to personal liberty.160
President Beinisch concluded that even if economic and administra-
tive efficiency are legitimate public purposes, they do not trump the
interests of liberty.161 The Court acknowledged that delegation to
private parties is an integral part of administrative law, but the Court
distinguished imprisonment powers as unique because they involve
the power to deprive individuals of human rights.162 Ultimately, the
majority in Academic Center emphasized that because punishment
is a core governmental function that involves fundamental rights to
liberty, delegations to private entities should be viewed with height-
ened scrutiny.163
C. Social Contract Principles in Academic Center
In Academic Center, President Beinisch underscored the Court’s
reliance on moral principles of state governance. Not surprisingly,
the Court situates the foundations of the opinion within modern
political philosophy.164 For example, the Court cited Thomas Hobbes
to define the role of public ministers.165 Also, the Court looked to
John Locke to establish that punishment is a jurisdiction reserved for
society as a whole, not the individuals within.166 The Court summa-
rized these two notions and concluded that even though Hobbes and
Locke were seventeenth century thinkers, their messages are inte-
gral to understanding contemporary liberal democracies:
[I]t would appear that the basic political principle that the state,
through the various bodies acting in it, is responsible for public
160. Id. at 27, 28.
161. Id. at 95.
162. See id. at 110.
163. See id. at 59 (stating the right to personal liberty has “exalted constitutional
status”).
164. Id. at 61.
165. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
61 (2009) (Isr.) (citing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER
OF A COMMON WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL (1651), at chap. XXIII).
166. Id. at 27, 61–62 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (1690)).
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security and the enforcement of the criminal law has remained un-
changed throughout all those years, and it is a part of the social
contract on which the modern democratic state is also based.167
Though the court attempted to evade explicitly defining criteria for
identifying core governmental powers, Justice Procaccia suggested
that the social contract does serve as a guiding framework for this
conceptualization:
The social contract, which gave the sovereign the responsibility
to define norms of conduct in society, is what also gave it the
responsibility for enforcing them. It delineates, in accordance
with the principles of the system of government, the limits of the
exercise of institutional power, the limits whereof are defined by
the duty of respecting rights of the individual as a human being.168
Justice Arbel reaffirms that liberty deprivation is a core governmen-
tal function, asserting that the social contract is the authority that
grants a sovereign the power to deprive individual liberty:
[The power to] deny or restrict liberty is given to the state by
virtue of a metaphorical ‘social contract’ that is made between it
and the citizens living in it, in which the citizens voluntarily
given the state the power to deny liberties and to make use of
coercive force, inter alia in order to guarantee their protection
and security and to protect their property.169
The social contract grants the sovereign the right to punish only to
further public interests, not private interests.170 Just as the Texas
court conveyed in Texas Boll Weevil,171 the Israeli Court expressed
concern about the differing motives of public and private entities
when liberty deprivation is involved.172 The public-private distinc-
tion is critical because public actions and private actions are treated
differently under the law. Put simply, there are certain instances in
which a legitimate government action may be unlawful in the pri-
vate arena. President Beinisch highlighted this paradox through the
example of the use of force: “[w]ere this force not exercised by the
167. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 120.
169. Id. at 106 (citation omitted).
170. See id. at 107.
171. Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 469–70 (Tex.
1997).
172. HCJ 2606/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
27, 128 (2009) (Isr.).
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competent organs of the state, . . . in order to further the general
public interest rather than a private interest, this use of force would
not have democratic legitimacy, and it would constitute de facto an
improper and arbitrary use of violence.”173 The opposite is also true.
The state’s legitimacy is what allows the state to exercise its pow-
ers,174 “since [state representatives] act within the framework of the
democratic political mechanism and are subject to its rules, their
legitimacy is enhanced.”175 Because the power to deprive rights be-
longs to the state, and the state must implement these powers, failure
to implement these powers jeopardizes the state’s legitimacy.176 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Arbel suggests that the power to de-
prive rights of liberty interests are distinctive, and the transfer of
these powers
erodes to some extent the concept of justice, which no longer
stands on its own as a goal in itself, and it may weaken the au-
thority of the organs of state, the integrity with which they are
regarded, public confidence in government and the nature of demo-
cratic government in its widest sense. In such circumstances,
depriving the prison inmates of their liberty loses a significant
element of the justification for it.177
Ultimately, the provisions of the social contract shape the frame-
work for the legitimate authority of the state. The state’s power to
deprive liberty is legitimate only because it is “exercised by and on
behalf of the state, after the person with regard to whom they are
exercised has been tried and convicted by the legal system of the
state.”178 The transfer of liberty deprivation powers to private actors
disrupts the state’s role in liberty deprivation and jeopardizes the
state’s legitimacy:
the violation of the right to personal liberty resulting from giving
a private enterprise the power to deny liberty within the context
of the enforcement of criminal law derives ipso facto from the
fact that the state is giving that party one of its most basic and
invasive powers, and by doing so the exercise of that power loses
a significant part of its legitimacy.179
173. Id. at 65.
174. Id. at 65–66.
175. Id. at 66.
176. See id. at 106–07.
177. Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
178. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance PD,
27, 68 (2009) (Isr.).
179. Id. at 60.
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is problematic for the “moral standing of the state vis-à-vis the public
in general.”180 On a macro level, this breach of the social contract
erodes the concept of justice, weakens the authority of the organs of
the state, and diminishes public confidence in the nature of demo-
cratic government.181 Academic Center represents the paradoxical
notion that allowing private actors to deprive inmates of their liberty
interests on behalf of the government “loses a significant element of
the justification for it.”182
CONCLUSION
Explaining Karl Marx, John Sutton once stated, “[i]f law is in-
evitably the servant of capitalism, reform efforts are, at best, a waste
of effort and, at worst, they contribute to the strengthening of capi-
talism.”183 Private prisons are a quintessential illustration of the
problematic relationship between law, capitalism, and the private
sector; but it is necessary to situate the discussion of private prisons
in the broader context of the role of punishment. Punishment should
correspond with a society’s political and social ideologies, and not
present moral dilemmas. The social contract serves as a guideline
for these core societal principles, and the Constitution merely institu-
tionalizes these common values. According to Emile Durkheim, pun-
ishment is imposed on those who violate the collective consciousness,
and in return, punishment simultaneously affirms social values.184
Yet, the criminal justice system can and does contradict societal
values of fairness and equality, particularly on the basis of class and
race.185 Still, moral cohesion is important in identifying and uphold-
ing societal values.186
180. Id. at 107.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. JOHN R. SUTTON, LAW/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERACTIONS, AND CHANGE 59 (Pine
Forge Press 2000).
184. Cyndi Banks, The Purpose of Criminal Punishment, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 120 (2004).
185. See generally Nekima Levy-Pounds, Justice for All? How the Fallout from the War
on Drugs Has Led to the Highest Incarceration Rate in the World, COVENANT COMPANION
13 (July 1, 2012), https://covenantcompanion.com/2012/07/01/justice-for-all [https://perma
.cc/93TC-3924].
186. In a study about public support for the California initiative that imposes a
mandatory life sentence for repeat felons (the “three strikes” law), sociologists found that
public punitiveness is linked most strongly to judgments about social conditions and to
underlying social values, not concerns about crime or the courts. Tom R. Tyler & Robert
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Though societal values fluctuate over time, the commitment to
fundamental rights remains constant. The right to liberty has been
deemed fundamental since time immemorial, for it is unquestion-
ably designated as an inalienable right that cannot be infringed upon
by the state. Nonetheless, the fundamental character of the right to
liberty is not adequately reflected in American legal jurisprudence.
Because of the vital nature of the right to liberty, courts should review
liberty deprivations with the most exacting scrutiny. The authority
to deprive liberty is one of the state’s most powerful yet sensitive
functions, and any delegation of that function should reflect the
fragility of that power. The transfer of the power to deprive liberty
should be approached with caution, and the government should re-
frain from allowing private actors to abuse that power. The previous
discussion shows that the delegation of liberty deprivation powers
to private corporations infringes on the foundational principles of a
democratic society. The nondelegation doctrine reinforces the sepa-
ration of powers that ensures governmental accountability, and the
social contract establishes the parameters of the relationship be-
tween a sovereign and its citizenry.
Though the private actors often provide social services, in the case
of private prisons, governmental interests in administrative and
economic efficiency are not compelling enough to outweigh societal
interests in liberty and state legitimacy. Academic Center serves as
an international precedent in privatization litigation, and the decision
reinforces the notion that certain functions are inherently govern-
mental. The Supreme Court of Israel’s ruling is insightful because
the case emerged just after Israel proposed to build a single private
prison. The decision came about prior to any actual operations of a
private facility. At the time of the ruling, neither the potential harms
nor the benefits of private prisons were yet realized. The Israel Su-
preme Court immediately recognized the conflicting motivations that
would inhibit private entities from serving public interests for fi-
nancial gain. While it is possible that private prisons could adequately
perform the tasks, the liberty interests at stake are too delicate to
be placed in private hands.
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